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I. INTRODUCTION
My topic for today’s presentation is second-parent adoption. I hope to
accomplish four things in my discussion. First, I will define second-parent adoption
and give some reasons that it is desirable for both parents and children. Second, I
will summarize the state of the law in terms of legislative enactments and case law in
the United States. Third, I will discuss the role of social science in second-parent
adoption cases. Finally, I will discuss some of the implications of recognizing these
adoptions.
II. SECOND-PARENT ADOPTION
A. What is it?
Second-parent adoption usually arises under the following scenario. A lesbian
couple2 decides to have a child together. One of the women is artificially
inseminated with sperm from a known or unknown donor. She carries the child to
term and gives birth. As the biological mother of the child, this woman has a legally
recognized relationship to her offspring. But what about the lesbian woman’s
partner, who has planned for the birth and plans to participate in parenting the child?
1

Associate Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State
University. J.D., 1983, University of Nebraska-Lincoln; Ph.D. (social psychology), 1988,
University of Nebraska-Lincoln.
2

Gay males may jointly adopt a child; see, e.g., In re M.M.D & B.H.M., 662 A.2d 837
(D.C. 1995); Theresa Glennon, Binding the Family Ties: A Child Advocacy Perspective on
Second-Parent Adoptions, 7 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 255, 255 n.2 (1998) (discussing
New Jersey case involving joint adoption by two gay men).
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She is not the biological parent of the child, has not contributed any genetic material
to the child (such as being an egg donor), and is not legally married to the child’s
parent. In short, the woman’s partner has no legal relationship to the child. Secondparent adoptions, then, are a mechanism by which the biological mother’s partner
can achieve a legally recognized relationship with the child by going to court and
adopting the child, without terminating the biological mother’s rights.
B. Why is it Desirable?
Without an adoption, the partner of the biological mother faces certain
disadvantages. She is not legally entitled to participate in making major life
decisions concerning the child, for example in terms of medical care. If the couple
separate, she would not be able to claim custody or visitation rights, although a few
cases have used equitable principles to entertain such claims. If the biological
mother were to die, the partner would not automatically have custody of the child. In
essence, she would stand as a stranger to the child.
From the child’s perspective, without adoption, the child would not have the right
to support from the partner, the right to inherit from her, or to obtain social security
benefits should she die.3 The child would not be eligible for health care coverage
under the partner’s health plan. If the biological mother died, the child might lose
the only remaining “parent” he or she has ever known. Thus, at both ends of the
equation, the partner and the child face clear legal disadvantages without secondparent adoption.
It is for these reasons that lesbian women have turned with increasing frequency
to the courts to recognize a legal relationship between the non-biological mother and
her partner’s child. These efforts have met with some success although, as Professor
Susan Becker will tell you shortly, not in the state of Ohio.
III. WHAT IS THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW?
To comprehend the current state of the law with respect to second-parent
adoption, it is necessary to understand that adoption is a statutory creation. It did not
exist at the common law. Therefore, it is important to remember that the availability
of second-parent adoption in any given state will turn on two crucial things: first, the
state’s adoption statutes and second, courts’ interpretation of those statutes.
A. The Statutes
Most state adoption statutes do not explicitly cover this situation. In fact, most
were written well before the idea of second-parent adoption was even contemplated.
Two exceptions to this general rule exist at the polar extremes. On the one hand,
Vermont’s adoption statute, revised in 1995, specifically recognizes the right to
second-parent adoption. It provides: “If a family unit consists of a parent and the
parent’s partner, and adoption is in the best interest of the child, the partner of a
parent may adopt a child of the parent. Termination of the parent’s parental rights is
unnecessary in an adoption under this subsection.”4 In addition, New Jersey has a
formal statewide policy mandating that lesbian, gay, or other unmarried couples

3

Glennon, supra note 2, at 258.

4

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 1-102(b) (1999).
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should be evaluated using the same standards as heterosexual, married couples.5
New York has enacted regulations providing gay people the same level of eligibility
in adoption as non-homosexual applicants.6
On the other hand, Florida has a global ban on adoption by lesbian or gay
individuals.7 This statute has withstood attack based on constitutional arguments that
it discriminates against gay or lesbian individuals.8 New Hampshire also had such a
global ban. That statute was preceded by an opinion of the New Hampshire Supreme
Court that such a statute would not violate any state or federal constitutional
provision.9 However, New Hampshire recently amended its adoption statute to
remove the prohibition on adoption and foster parenting by homosexual persons.10
B. Cases Interpreting State Adoption Statutes
In the absence of a state statute explicitly permitting or banning adoption by gay
and lesbian persons, courts have had to interpret existing statutory enactments to
determine whether second-parent adoption is permissible under the terms of the
statute.
Broadly speaking, state adoption statutes usually permit adoption under two
general categories. The first is so-called stranger adoptions. These include instances
in which the biological parents of a child terminate their parental rights and a new
person or couple adopts a child. These are called stranger adoptions because most
often they involve strangers to the child. It is interesting to note in this regard that
Ohio has permitted a gay man to adopt a child.11
The second category of adoptions permitted under many state statutes concerns
adoptions by stepparents. These situations occur when a biological parent remarries
and the parent’s new spouse wishes to legally adopt the child. When stepparents
adopt, the rights of the biological parent are not terminated (although the other
biological parent’s rights are terminated)--thus, leaving the child with two parents.
One common avenue used by lesbian couples in adopting is to argue that their
cases resemble stepparent adoptions.12 The major legal obstacle encountered in these
cases is that the statutes provide for the termination of the biological parent’s rights
because they are not stepparents. This would lead to an anomalous result in the case
of second-parent adoption. In order for the nonbiological mother to adopt, the
biological mother’s rights would have to be terminated. Courts in these cases, then,
have to decide whether that usual termination provision prevents such second-parent
adoptions or can be avoided.
5

Gay Couple Allowed to Adopt Second Child, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1999, § B, at 6.

6

Vincent C. Green, Same-Sex Adoption: An Alternative Approach to Gay Marriage in
New York, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 399, 417 n.113 (1996).
7

FLA. STAT. ch. 63.042(3) (1999).

8

Cox v. State Dep’t of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 656 So.2d 902 (Fla. 1995).

9

Opinion of the Justices, 525 A.2d 1095 (N.H. 1987).

10

N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 170-B:4, 170-F:6 (1999).

11

In re Adoption of Charles B., 552 N.E.2d 884 (Ohio 1990).

12

Lesbian and gay couples have also jointly adopted children; see, e.g., In re M.M.D &
B.H.M., 662 A.2d 837 (D.C. 1995).
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To date, the case law in this area is a mixed bag. Three state supreme courts have
held that second-parent adoption is permitted within their states--Massachusetts,13
Vermont,14 and New York.15 Intermediate courts have permitted second-parent
adoptions in the District of Columbia,16 Illinois,17 and New Jersey.18 According to one
source, lower courts have approved second-parent adoptions in Alabama, Alaska,
California, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico,
Oregon, Pennsylvania (conflicting decisions), Rhode Island, Texas, and
Washington.19 A considerable number of opinions in this area are unpublished,
making it difficult to determine the precise number of states that permit this practice.
The fact that the opinions are unpublished seems significant because of their
unavailability for subsequent citation.
On the other hand, two state supreme courts, Wisconsin20 and Connecticut,21 have
held that second-parent adoptions are not permissible within the statutory language
of their adoption laws. The Connecticut opinion was just released in 1999. Lower
courts in Colorado,22 Pennsylvania,23 and Ohio24 have also prohibited second-parent
adoption. Professor Susan Becker will discuss a recent Ohio case on this question.
IV. THE ROLE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE IN SECOND-PARENT ADOPTION CASES
Social science information has played a significant role in some of the opinions
recognizing second-parent adoption.25 In the past, courts used social science in

13

In re Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993).

14

Adoption of B.L.V.B. and E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993).

15

In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995).

16

In re M.M.D. & B.H.M., 662 A.2d 837 (D.C. 1995).

17

In re K.M., 653 N.E.2d 888 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).

18

In the Matter of the Adoption of two children by H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1995).
19
Jeffrey G. Gibson, Lesbian and Gay Prospective Adoptive Parents: The Legal Battle, 26
HUM. RTS. 7, 10 (1999).
20

In the Interest of Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678 (Wis. 1994), reconsideration denied
525 N.W.2d 736 (1994).
21

In re the Adoption of Baby Z., 724 A.2d 1035 (Conn. 1999).

22

Matter of the Adoption of T.K.J., 931 P.2d 488 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996), reh’g denied
(Aug. 1, 1996) and cert. denied (Jan. 21, 1997).
23
In re Adoption of B.L.P., 16 Fiduc. Rep. 2d 95, 98 (Montg. Co. Orphans’ Ct.) (1996),
reconsideration denied, 16 Fiduc. Rep. 2d 118 (Montg. Co. Orphans’ Ct. 1996); cited in
Glennon, supra note 2, at 257-75.
24

In re Adoption of Jane Doe, 719 N.E.2d 1071 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998).

25

Marc E. Elovitz, Adoption by Lesbian and Gay People: The Use and Mis-Use of Social
Science, 2 DUKE J. OF GENDER L. & POL’Y 207 (1995); Charlotte J. Patterson, Adoption of
Minor Children by Lesbian and Gay Adults: A Social Science Perspective, 2 DUKE J. GENDER
L. & POL’Y 191 (1995).
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family law cases to decide matters of custody and visitation.26 A typical case
involved a married couple who were divorcing and fighting for custody of, or
visitation with, their children. One of the parents identified him- or herself as
homosexual. To combat negative assumptions and stereotypes about homosexuality,
the gay parent often presented, and courts frequently incorporated in their written
opinions, relevant social science. This growing body of empirical research showed
that no significant differences existed between children raised in gay and
heterosexual households. It also demonstrated that many of the assumptions about
harm to children by being raised by a gay parent were false.
Likewise, in deciding to permit the mother’s partner to adopt (and that it is in the
child’s best interest to do so), many courts have relied upon extant social science
documenting the fact that children are not harmed by being raised in gay households.
For example, in one case the court wrote: “Concern that a child would be
disadvantaged by growing up in a single sex household is not borne out by the
professional literature examined by this court.”27 Similarly, another New York court
commented: “In addition, upbringing by same sex parents does not negatively
impact the children involved, incidence of same sex orientation among the children
of gays and lesbians occurs as randomly and in the same proportion as it does among
children in the general population and social stigma is an unfounded concern.” 28
Thus, courts are relying in these cases on one of the most well-developed bodies
of social science information in the homosexual literature--namely the effects on
children of having a lesbian or gay parent. The same body of social science
information that has been used, often successfully, in child custody and visitation
cases is now appearing in the new contexts of second-parent adoption and even the
gay marriage cases in aid of the recognition of these new legal relationships. The
leap from custody and visitation cases involving the breakup of a heterosexual
family unit to those involving homosexual unions was a logical progression. In this
way, social science continues to have a significant impact on the development of gay
rights in the family law arena.
One final note on the impact of social science information in gay family law
cases is that there has been a recent attack on the underlying social science. One
legal scholar, Lynn Wardle, has argued that the social science that courts have used
in these cases is methodologically flawed.29 In some senses, this attack on the
26

Patricia J. Falk, Lesbian Mothers: Psychosocial Assumptions in Family Law, 44 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 941 (1989); Patricia J. Falk, The Gap Between Psychosocial Assumptions and
Empirical Research in Lesbian-Mother Child Custody Cases, in REDEFINING FAMILIES:
IMPLICATIONS FOR CHILDREN’S DEVELOPMENT (Adele E. Gottfried & Allen W. Gottfried eds.,
1994); Patricia J. Falk, The Prevalence of Social Science in Gay Rights Cases: The
Synergistic Influences of Historical Context, Justificatory Citation, and Dissemination Efforts,
41 WAYNE L. REV. 1 (1994).
27

In the Matter of Evan, 153 Misc. 2d 844, 851 n.1, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997, 997 (1992).

28

In the Matter of the Adoption of Caitlin, 163 Misc.2d 999, 999, 622 N.Y.S.2d 835, 835
(1994) (headnotes).
29
Lynn D. Wardle, The Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Children, 1997 U.
ILL. L. REV. 833 (1997); see also Carlos A. Ball & Janice Farrell Pea, Warring With Wardle:
Morality, Social Science, and Gay and Lesbian Parents, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 253 (1998);
Lynn D. Wardle, Fighting With Phantoms: A Reply to Warring With Wardle, 1998 U. ILL. L.
REV. 629 (1998).
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underlying basis for the decisions in some cases seems to indicate that the social
science has had a powerful effect.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF SECOND-PARENT ADOPTIONS
A. The Good News
On the positive side, participants at a recent gay rights conference heralded
second-parent adoptions as the single most significant advance in gay rights in recent
years.30 Several aspects of this trend are worthy of closer consideration.
First, second-parent adoption represents a second generation of legal
developments in the recognition of gay rights. Without the previous efforts by gay
litigants to go to court and fight for their legal rights and without the success of those
earlier custody and visitation cases, it is hard to imagine that courts would be
considering the kinds of cases that they are hearing today. This new genre of family
law cases is built on the foundation of prior successful litigation efforts.
Second, these new cases also differ from the preceding cases. Unlike the custody
and visitation cases discussed earlier, second-parent adoption cases involve the
creation of a new legal status for the biological mother’s partner, namely legal
parenthood, not simply awarding custody or visitation rights.
Finally, and most importantly, the unique nature of second-parent adoption cases
is underscored by the fact that two lesbian women now have legally recognized
relationships with a child although they have no legal relationship between them. In
short, the three members of this family form an imperfect triangle; two sides are
legally complete, but the third side is not legally acknowledged. In a limited sense,
then, second-parent adoption may be viewed as an end-run around the traditional
prohibition of gay marriage. As one court wrote: “Helen and Susan, recognizing
that the laws of the Commonwealth do not permit them to enter into a legally
cognizable marriage, believe that the best interests of Tammy require legal
recognition of her identical emotional relationship to both women.”31
B. Critiques of Second-Parent Adoptions
Second-parent adoptions have been criticized from both within and outside the
gay-lesbian community. In a recent article entitled A Lesbian-Centered Critique of
Second-Parent Adoptions, Professor Julie Shapiro has argued that these adoptions
only benefit some, but not all, lesbian mothers.32 They reinforce the notion that there
are “real” mothers (those who are able to adopt) and other lesbian mothers. Also
they tend to be available to only a certain kind of lesbian woman--professionals who
are well-educated, own property, and raise children within planned nuclear families.
Shapiro calls these women, “but for” lesbians, because but for their lesbianism they
would be perfect.33 These adoptions are not available to low-income women or
women who have certain characteristics.
30

Julie Shapiro, A Lesbian-Centered Critique of Second-Parent Adoptions, 14 BERKELEY
WOMEN’S L.J. 17 (1999).
31

Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 316 (Mass. 1993).

32

Shapiro, supra note 30, at 29.

33

Id. at 31-32.
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Moreover, second-parent adoptions validate “but for” families, reinforcing the
model of a two-parent, nuclear family as the preferred family form.34 Finally,
availability of second-parent adoptions may undermine the claims of women who
have not completed one. In a recent Vermont case, the court held it against the
biological mother’s partner that she had failed to adopt.35
Shapiro does not ultimately argue against second-parent adoption, but instead
thinks that it is important not to overlook the fact that many lesbian women are “nonlegal” mothers.36 In essence, second-parent adoption is only a partial solution. She
also advocates continuing to seek a solution for those who cannot take advantage of
second-parent adoptions.37
VI. CONCLUSION
I would like to end with the language from one second-parent adoption case. In
this opinion, a New York trial court noted that second-parent adoption is simply a
legal recognition of the diversity of current families in the United States:
This Court is aware that these cases present family units many in our
society believe to be outside the mainstream of American family life. The
reality, however, is, that most children today do not live in so-called
“traditional” 1950 television situation comedy type families with a stayat-home mother and a father who works from 9:00 to 5:00. According to
Bureau of the Census statistics, 25% of children today are born out of
wedlock to single women, mostly young, minority, and impoverished;
half of all marriages end in divorce; and married couples with children
now make up only 26% of United States households. It is unrealistic to
pretend that children can only be successfully reared in an idealized
concept of family, the product of nostalgia for a time long past.38
Returning to the theme of this panel “Reconstructing Families: Adoption of Children
by Same-Sex Partners,” it seems obvious that American families have already
undergone considerable reconstruction. Now, the task at hand is gaining legal
recognition for the multiple variations of modern family life as they already exist.

34

Id. at 32.

35

Titchenal v. Dexter, 693 A.2d 682 (Vt. 1997); see also Shapiro, supra note 30, at 32-35
(discussing the case).
36

Shapiro, supra note 30, at 37.

37

Id.

38

In the Matter of the Adoption of Caitlin, 163 Misc.2d 999, 1008, 622 N.Y.S.2d 835, 841
(1994); see also Adoption of B.L.V.B. and E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1276 (Vt. 1993) where
the Vermont Supreme Court wrote:
We are not called upon to approve or disapprove of the relationship between the
appellants. Whether we do or not, the fact remains that Deborah has acted as a parent
of B.L.V.B. and E.L.V.B. from the moment they were born. To deny legal protection
of their relationship, as a matter of law, is inconsistent with the children’s best
interests and therefore the public policy of this state, as expressed in our statutes
affecting children.
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